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Abstract
This study aims to examine the effect of insurance coverage on medical
expenditure in the United States. The data was gathered from the Household
Component Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and is a cross-sectional data set
with a sample size of approximately 1500 observations. The study also
distinguishes between public and private insurance coverage to compare the
potential moral hazard in the two separate markets. The results of this study
suggest that insurance status, specifically public, has a strong positive effect on
healthcare expenditure. This result, combined with a negative relationship
between household income and healthcare expenditure, suggests that the
source of financial funds rather than the ability to pay determines the demand for
healthcare services. The study indicates that individuals are very sensitive to the
financial incentives provided by public insurance and inefficiencies within the
public insurance market should be examined by future research.
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I. Introduction
The healthcare system in the United States has long since abandoned a
free market approach regarding the provision of services. Due to the critical
nature of healthcare services, policies place emphasis on the provision of
services to those less able to purchase health care. Since the creation of
Medicare and Medicaid the government has set price ceilings, such as the freeze
on Medicare physician fees from 1984 to 1986, and heavily subsidized the
provision of insurance to lower socioeconomic groups (Catlin & Cowan, 17).
Government provision of insurance removes the financial incentive to
make healthy lifestyle choices. Healthy lifestyle choices are potentially
expensive, inconvenient, and time consuming for the individual (Jeon, et al.).
However the research clearly suggests that avoiding health-risk behaviors
eliminates excessive healthcare spending. Therefore, by shifting the economic
burden of healthcare back to individuals the nation would potentially be able to
reallocate wasted funds.
When determining healthcare policy, the issue under consideration is most
often related to meeting the needs of the people rather than a discussion
regarding the supply and demand of the market. Health risk behaviors increase
the demand for health expenditure overtime and are potentially avoidable
(Cerimele & Katon).
This study aims to examine inefficiencies within the healthcare system in
the United States. Specifically the study aims to analyze the effect of moral
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hazard on healthcare expenditure. Moral hazard potentially affects demand
through the subsidization of healthcare. This study posses the research question,
what effect does insurance coverage have on medical expenditure in the United
States.
As a secondary focus this study distinguishes between public and private
insurance coverage to compare moral hazard between the two separate markets.
The hypothesis for this study is that individuals with insurance will spend more
than those without insurance due to a decrease in financial incentives. The
second hypothesis is that individuals with public insurance will spend more than
those with private due a less restrictive coverage environment in the public
market.

II. Literature Review
Similar to other industries, substitutes for healthcare services exist.
Substitutes that are currently available for the consumption of healthcare
services include healthy lifestyle choices and activities that decrease stress in
place of direct medical care. Since Medicare and Medicaid were introduced in
1965, the use and intensity of personal healthcare services has consistently
increased in the United States (Catlin & Cowan, 15).
The current body of research contradicts the concept that healthcare is a
basic need and is unable to be controlled by behaviors outside of healthcare. For
example, “a 10% relative drop in smoking in every state is predicted to be
followed by an expected $63 billion reduction (in 2012 US dollars) in healthcare
expenditure the next year” (Lightwood & Glance). The consumption of cigarettes
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is an entirely preventable activity that contributes significantly to the healthcare
expenditure of the United States.
Emergency medical visits and the utilization of potentially preventable
provisions from medical providers are much more common in areas with
increased economic deprivation. This could be due to the lack of prevention
methods taken due to financial limitations (Davies et al.,1678). It is possible that
economically deprived areas are less likely to provide healthy food sources, as
highly processed, lower quality, goods are cheaper.
The current body of research clearly suggests that lifestyle is a large
indicator of the need for health services. In order to examine the demand for
healthcare the variation in healthy habits across numerous socioeconomic
communities must be examined. Factors that have been shown to contribute to
healthcare expenditure, such as tobacco use (Xu et al.), inadequate nutrition,
and obesity (Cerimele & Katon), are possible determinants leading to potentially
avoidable healthcare expenditure.
Previous studies suggest that individuals with lower socioeconomic status
are less adaptive to changing health care beliefs. This could be due to a more
constricted flow of information to the community. The negative correlation
between socioeconomic status and the adoption speed of new theories regarding
health could also be due to varying education levels. However, the current body
of research suggests that marketing efforts are more successful among lower
socioeconomic classes. The power of marketing has been researched
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extensively and it is clear that healthcare centered advertising plays a large
impact on the general opinion of the population (Suman et al., 7).
The literature identifies a negative correlation between education levels
and smoking rates in the population of the United States, as well as a negative
correlation between income and the rate of smoking (“Current Cigarette…”). It is
a possibility that individuals who smoke are also more susceptible to financial
incentives, as they potentially possess less income. Additionally, the negative
correlation identified between education levels and the rate of smoking by the
CDC has certain implications when combined with the marketing trends identified
by Suman et al. as previously noted. Individuals who participate in health risk
behaviors may be the most susceptible to marketing efforts. This suggests that
policy recommendations targeting the lower socioeconomic classes will be
impactful due to the increased effect of marketing on the demographic and the
increased participation in activities that lead to higher healthcare spending of the
target population (Suman et al., 7).
Increased government healthcare spending is also potentially harming the
economy through an additional method. Government intervention is potentially
constricting the market from moving towards supply side substitutes. A specific
case provides evidence for this in India. India is currently experiencing a major
shortage of qualified doctors, and has come up with alternatives to meet the
large demand. Doctors only perform the most complex procedures and leave
less skilled operations to employees who earn much lower wages. As a result,
surgeries in India cost approximately 1/15th as much as they do in the US. India
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has also decreased the cost of childbirth by implementing the services of
midwives instead of doctors (Bangalore & Framingham, 102).
The lack of competition in the US market due to government intervention
also potentially limits the incentive to increase the use of technology in the health
sector (Bangalore & Framingham, 102). If the pressure of the free market was
reintroduced it is possible that healthcare providers would decrease costs in the
long term by implementing technology and utilizing less expensive employees in
order to meet the demand for healthcare. The current situation regarding
healthcare spending in the United States potentially allows government failure to
occur.
The 63$ billion that would be saved by a 10% decrease in cigarette
smoking as mentioned previously could be put towards other means in the better
interest of the nation (Lightwood & Glance). Smoking is a specific health risk
activity committed by of 15% of the American population and is causing
economic inefficiencies (“Current Cigarette…”). A counter argument regards the
inelasticity of cigarettes. Theory suggests that while a decrease in smoking would
lead to less healthcare spending, it is unrealistic to assume that smoking can or
will decrease due the intense commitment of smokers. However, cigarette
consumption among the American population decreased from 20% to 15%
during the time period of 2005 to 2015. This statistic suggests that while the
decrease has been slow, cigarette consumption is not perfectly inelastic
(“Current Cigarette… ”). These results can be applied to other health risk
behaviors, such as obesity.
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The current research provides overwhelming evidence to support the
theory that moral hazard is a significant burden to the economy of developing
countries. However, less evidence can be found regarding developed nations
and the United States specifically (Yawson et al.). In 2003 Ghana implemented a
national health insurance plan to promote access to healthcare throughout the
country. Studies examined the utilization of healthcare services between the
insured and uninsured populations and found significant differences in healthcare
service utilization between the two demographics. Insured costumers were found
to use the available services much more often than those uninsured and the
study provides significant support for the theory of moral hazard regarding
healthcare (Yawson et al.).
It is not only consumer moral hazard that needs to be considered.
Additionally in Ghana, studies recognized that multiple costumers with the same
ailment were given different treatments due to their insurance status (Yawson et
al.). Over diagnosis has been recognized as an issue in Ghana, as well as
Uganda, specifically with Malaria patients (Ghai et al.). Less research has
examined the prevalence of over-diagnosis in the United States.
The lack of available literature regarding supply side moral hazard in the
United States raises questions. Corruptions within certain subsets of the
healthcare industry have been identified, specifically regarding the
pharmaceutical industry. Many cases suggesting corruption have occurred
involving drug companies, all of which are public knowledge. Drug companies
have paid large settlements in the wake of accusations regarding illegal
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marketing attempts (Berns, 560). While surprisingly less research is present
regarding over-diagnosis and corruption in the US regarding overall health, the
body of literature is present to suggest that prescription drugs are overprescribed (Berns, 558).
The pharmaceutical industry is directly related to health expenditure. From
2000 to 2002 physicians and clinical services increased 7.8% on average
annually, driven by a “rapid increase in retail prescription drug expenditures”
(Catlin & Cowan, 21). During the period, multiple new blockbuster drugs were
introduced and the intensity of marketing efforts from the pharmaceutical industry
increased dramatically.
The Affordable Care Act provided an estimated $100 billion in revenue to
drug companies, who also rank first in lobbyist spending among all industries at
$234 million in 2012. The health sector also ranked first among sectors at $486
million in 2012. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the health sector spent
more on lobbying in 2009 than in 2012, 2009 being the year ‘Obamacare’ was
formulated (Fields, 559).
A possible solution to consumer moral hazard, utilized in other insurance
markets, is to provide incentives for behaviors that are correlated with the
decreased risk of loss to the insurance company (Stewart, 194). For example,
auto insurance companies provide ‘safe driver discounts’ and other incentives
that encourage the individual to follow traffic laws that are in place to decrease
the risk of harm to body and property. In this way, auto insurance companies
reduce the risk of moral hazard. If companies granted full coverage to drivers
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without considering risk, less incentives would exist for individuals to drive slower
and pay more attention to safety signs and policies (Stewart, 193).
Government provided insurance essentially removes the incentives to live
more carefully. Lifestyle choices that have been suggested to cause increased
spending, such as a high BMI or consistent smoking, could potentially be
incentivized against to the betterment of the American economy. In the pursuit of
equity many policy makers attempt to make healthcare available to those who
cannot afford it. It is possible, that through the pursuit of equity, individuals are
indirectly being financially encouraged to continue to partake in health risk
behaviors.

III. Theoretical Model
Model 1 (Full Model)
Expenditure = β0 + β1 Insured + β2 Race + β3 RegionNE + β4 RegionMW + β5 Sex +
β6 Married + β7 Age + β8 Exercise + β9 BMI + β10 Smoking + β11 Income + ε
Dependent Variable:
 Y1= Individual Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015)
Independent Variables:
 X1 = Insured
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X2 = Race (White)
X3 = Region (Northeast)
X4 = Region (Midwest)
X5 = Sex (Male)
X6 = Marriage Status (Married)
X7 = Age
X8 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week)
X9 = Body Mass Index
X10 = Currently Smoking
X11 = Annual Income

The model utilizes Annual Health Care Expenditure of each Individual as
the dependent variable. This figure was gathered by combining the healthcare
expenditure of each individual from both years of the survey, 2014 and 2015, and
deriving the average annual expenditure. In order to examine the theory of moral
hazard regarding the healthcare market, the independent variable in question is
the insurance status of the individual, those insured compared to those not
insured. The theory under examination aims to discover whether insurance
coverage removes the incentive to live a healthy lifestyle. Early statistical models
did not include as many factors as the full model above, however due to the
model’s low explanatory power the data set was examined to include more
indicators of healthcare expenditure.
Many factors were included in order to account for demographic
differences. Race was separated into ‘White’ and ‘Non White’. Regional
differences were also accounted for. There are many possibilities for the cause of
spending variation between regions. Some possibilities include the varying costs
of services as well as varying standard lifestyle. The two regions included in the
data set were each selected due to their respective number of urban centers.
Research suggests that the number of urban centers per mile is negatively
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correlated with obesity. The expected coefficient for the northeast region is
negative, as this part of the nation has the highest number of urban centers. The
midwest region is expected to have a positive relationship as it has the lowest
number of urban centers.
Sex was included in the model and measured as male or not. The
expected coefficient was negative, as older women tend to experience health
issues with more intensity than men (Yong et al.). The study hypothesized that
men would exhibit lower levels of spending across the board.
Marital Status is included as the body of literature suggests a strong
correlation between BMI and the marital status of an individual (Khan et al.). The
expected coefficient is positive suggesting that individuals who are married will
have higher levels of healthcare expenditure.
The current body of literature has illuminated a relationship between
obesity, smoking, and education levels (Cerimele & Katon). Due to this
relationship, current smoking status was included as an independent variable.
The expected effect of smoking status is a positive relationship, suggesting an
individual who smokes is likely to have higher total expenditure.
Age was not originally included in the model but was ultimately added to
help distinguish between public healthcare insurance coverage. The final aspect
of the study examines the difference between insurance type rather than
insurance status. Including age allows for the difference to be exclusively due to
the different type of insurance rather than older individuals simply needing more
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coverage, specifically with the provision of Medicare. The expected coefficient for
age is positive.
Exercise and Body Mass Index were included to account for expenditure
due to lifestyle choices on behalf of the individual. Obesity creates demand for
potentially avoidable medical services. The expected coefficient for exercise is
negative suggesting that individuals who participate in regular exercise will
decrease their demand for medical services. The expected coefficient for BMI is
positive suggesting that individuals with a higher BMI will have a need for more
medical services and ultimately have more healthcare expenditure.
Annual income is included in the model to account for the ability to pay for
services. The expected coefficient is positive suggesting that as individuals have
more income they will be more willing to spend money on healthcare services as
the opportunity cost of alternatives will decrease.
The error term encapsulates all variation within the model not explained by
the identified independent variables. After a final model has been determined the
study will examine the effects of public verse private insurance on healthcare
expenditure. The expected coefficient is a positive relationship between public
insurance and expenditure. Private insurance includes more limitations and
regulations, creating a deterrent for those intending to spend. This model
provides a distinction between separate types of coverage to examine moral
hazard in different financial markets, public and private.

IV. Empirical Model
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In order to help smooth the data the average of spending for the individual
was taken from 2014 and 2015 in order to account for any irregularities.
Specifically this helps account for accidents that are less related to health
lifestyle and overall health. All factors in the full model were statistically
significant at the 95% level. However, many variables accounted for little
variation in the dependent variable. Model 2 attempted to minimize the number of
factors in order to produce more economically significant results. In order to
transition from the first to the second model many variables were eliminated.
Model 2
Expenditure= β0 + β1 Insured + β2 Race + β3 Age + β4 Exercise + β5 Income + ε
Dependent Variable:
 Y1= Average Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015)
Independent Variables:
 X1 =Insured
 X2 = Race
 X3 = Age
 X4 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week)
 X5 = Income

The second model included the key variable of insurance status. Race
and age were also included as they were the most significant determinants of
demographic differences. Exercise was included to account for lifestyle. Income
was included to account for the ability of the individual to pay for healthcare
services independently.
BMI and exercise were both included in the full model in an attempt to capture
the effect of activity and nutrition. Exercise was chosen to represent lifestyle in
model 2, as the t-value was more significant than that of BMI. It can be
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ascertained that those who are health conscious enough to exercise five times a
week also make healthy choices in other areas of their lives. Due to this
relationship it is acceptable to remove BMI and suggest that the model still
accounts for health behavior.
Smoking, while statistically significant, was eliminated from the final model.
Smoking most likely will have an impact on the expenditure of the individual all at
one time. An individual could smoke for a long time without actually incurring
costs. Smoking is shown to greatly affect total national expenditure on larger
nationwide studies and can also be implied to increase the expenditure of the
individual over the course of their life. However a two-year time period is likely
not a long enough time span to accurately evaluate the incurring costs of
smoking. It is also possible that an individual may have only begun to smoke, in
which case the incurring costs are potentially a long way in the future.
Overall, in decreasing from 12 to 5 variables the R-squared statistic dropped
by .5% suggesting that originally too many factors were included. However this
was done in an attempt to explain as much of the variation as possible as early
regressions struggled to produce significant R-squared statistics. In an attempt to
increase the explanatory power of the full model the data set was re-examined
and additional independent variables were added.
.
Model 3 kept all of the factors of Model 2, except for the key variable of
insurance coverage. In order to assess Model 3 the population was slightly
altered. Model 3 utilized the population of individuals who had insurance only,
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and examined the differences in spending among those with public and private
insurance. The first variable in Model 3 is public insurance status.

Model 3
Expenditure= β0 + β1 Publically Insured + β2 Race + β3 Age + β4 Exercise + β5
Income + ε
Dependent Variable:
Y1= Average Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015)
Independent Variables:
X1 = Publically Insured
X2 = Race
X3 = Age
X4 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week)
X5 =Income

V. Data Sources and Description
Many different data sets were examined throughout the study in order to
derive statically significant results. In order to establish statistical significance a
high-powered test was needed. Due the variation within the dependent variable,
and the dependence on the variation of a large number of factors, a large sample
size was required. Ideally a longitude survey would be conducted to evaluate the
intensity of services utilized pre and post implementation of insurance. The data
needed to be applicable inside the United States as the study intended to
examine the effects nationally. Results within dependent nations have been
examined in the past and moral hazard specifically in the U.S. was the focus of
the study.
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The first data set examined United States expenditure over time. The first
year encompassing accurate data for the relevant variables identified in the
literature was 1991, and the data was then examined from 1991 until 2016.
However the sample size was unable to produce statistically significant results.
The second data set was a cross-sectional look at all 50 states in 2016. The
sample size of the data was also an issue with the second data set.
The third and final data set which was ultimately utilized for the purpose of
the study was gathered from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The specific
survey used was the most recent Household Component Survey, which analyzed
approximately 15,000 households over a two year time period from 2014 to 2015.
This survey was gathered nationally and provides the most accurate
representation of health and healthcare services across the entire United States.
The survey includes 5 rounds of interviews across 2 full calendar years.
Computer assisted personal interviewing is utilized to gather information between
interviews. Household statistics are reported by a single household respondent
(“MEPS”).
The original 15,000 entries were edited down to 9,000 entries for which
responses in regards to all relevant variables were accounted for. In addition the
final sample was limited to adults ages 17 and older. In cleaning the data all
individuals with incomplete answers, inapplicable answers, or anyone who chose
not to respond to a question needed to be removed. The elimination of data
created response bias. It is unclear why an individual would refrain from
answering for certain categories.
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VI. Econometric Analysis
Model 2 produced an R squared of .073 suggesting that the model
accounts for 7.3% of the variation in total healthcare expenditure. The model
included 9,197 observations and had an F statistic of 143.81. All independent
variables are significant at the 99.9% confidence level.
Race had a positive relationship with expenditure, as individuals
identifying as “White” were predicted to spend $2031 more on healthcare
annually holding all else constant. This result aligns with the expected
relationship at the outset of the study. Age also has a positive relationship with
expenditure, as each yearly increase in age was suggested to lead to a $141
increase in annual healthcare expenditure holding all else constant. This result
aligns with the expected coefficient sign for age.
Exercise had a negative relationship with expenditure. This finding
suggests that lifestyle plays a large part in determining healthcare spending.
Individuals who exercise at least five times a week are expected to spend $2338
less on healthcare per year holding all else constant.
According to the model, individuals who have health insurance are
predicted to spend $2715 more on healthcare annually holding all else constant.
This result provides significant evidence for the case of moral hazard regarding
the healthcare insurance market.
The one factor that did not show the expected relationship was income.
Income was negatively correlated with total expenditure. The coefficient suggests
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that for every a decrease of $10 in expenditure is expected to result from every
$1000 increase in income. This suggests that ability to pay plays much less of a
role in determining healthcare expenditure than the source of the funds. One
possible explanation for relationship is the negative correlation between income
and obesity identified by the literature.
The constant is -2325 suggesting that an individual not deriving a value
from any independent variable would have negative healthcare spending. This
constant is difficult to interpret. Specifically the variable of age presents an issue,
as all subjects in the study were at least 17 years old. The predicted spending in
the case of the constant would only be the case if the individual was zero years
of age and received no income.

Results: Model 2

P values:

*** = <.001

** = .001 - .01 * = .01 - .05
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The third model included the factors of race, age, exercise, and income,
but slightly altered the key variable. Rather than examining the insured verse
uninsured populations, the third model only looked at the insured population and
examined differences between the types of insurance. The coefficients for each
independent variable remained within 20% of the value respectively presented in
model 2 throughout the transition.
The third model accounts for 7.4% of the variation within the dependent
model with an R-squared of .074 and an F statistic of 112.73. All variables are
statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.
The independent variable for type of insurance, ‘public,’ has a positive
relationship with the dependent variable and a coefficient of 2544. The
relationship is consistent with expectations and the coefficient suggests that
individuals with public insurance will spend $2544 more on healthcare services
annually holding all else constant.

Results: Model 3
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P values:

*** = <.001

** = .001 - .01 * = .01 - .05

VII. Econometric Problems
No multicollinearity exists within the model. All VIFs are under 1.2.
Additionally no independent variable is correlated with another by more than
25%. There is no contradiction with the F probability. Autocorrelation does not
relate to the cross-sectional data set.
One issue with the results is the presence of heteroscedasticity. Model 2
produces a chi squared statistic of 1480.52 significant at the 99.9% level.
Similarities most likely exist between groups within the insured, race, exercise
and income variables, skewing the variance between standard errors. Further
studies should examine better linear nonbiased estimates that have a lower
sampling variance in order to get closer to the true population parameter.
The model most likely suffers from omitted variable bias. When predicting
health care expenditure there are many relevant factors that come into play.
Omitted variable bias is most likely the cause for the presence heteroscedasticity
in the model. To correct this issue, more variables were added to the full model.
However, attempts to increase explanatory power were unsuccessful.

VIII. Discussion: Limitations and Implications
The fit of the final model is lower than ideal with an R-squared statistic of
.074. The model leaves a large amount of variance to be explained. Due to the
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nature of the dependent variable this stands to reason, as many factors
contribute to the variation that are difficult to account for. The market for products
and services significantly contributes to nominal outcomes of healthcare
spending. The cost of services is determined by supply and demand and this
study mainly focused on determining the quantity of services. Future studies
should isolate spending on specific illnesses and procedures that are common,
such as joint pain or heart disease, in order to control for market variations.
The cost of technology, the quantity of investment, and the marketing efforts
of providers all play a role in the market. Accidents also play a large part in
determining the demand for healthcare services on behalf of the individual.
Genetics are an additional factor contributing to health status, especially later in
life. Future studies should examine family medical history as a predictor of
health.
An additional limitation of the study was due to the data available. The study
uses cross-sectional data and does not account for the total expenditure of the
individual over time. However with such a large sample size, the study should
come close to compensating for this as it encompasses individuals across all
areas of life. The sample includes those who are paying large and small amounts
for healthcare compared to their lifetime average.
The results are not enough to suggest causality. This is a limitation of the
data. The study identifies a correlation. However, in order to suggest causation
the test would have to include panel data over a long enough period of time to
account for the variation in health expenditure pre and post instigation of
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insurance coverage. The dependent variable needs this time to avoid error as the
behavior and situations of individuals may not lead to a change in healthcare
spending in the short term, and the time span must be long enough to account
for major changes down the road. Additionally the test would have to essentially
provide insurance to those who did not have it before and see how spending
habits were altered holding everything else constant. Or in the case of the third
model, an individual with private insurance would have to be given public
insurance and then monitored over to time to account for spending habits that
were related purely to the different type of coverage.
However, the coefficients have significant economic implications. The
coefficients suggest that between the two groups there are large differences in
spending. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that insurance coverage
and public insurance coverage cause the individual to utilize health services
more frequently, holding all else constant.
While significant evidence exists in previous studies to suggest that
individuals increase expenditure under insurance coverage, this study
contributes to the current body of literature through the results of the third model
(Stewart). The finding that the coefficient and difference between the public and
privately insured groups mirror the affect of those with insurance and those
without is a significant addition to the current body of research. Studies have
identified the positive relationship between spending and insurance coverage
mainly in developing nations, and this study also contributes to the research
regarding developed markets. (Yawson, et al.). The results have extreme
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economical implications. If private insurance is capable of providing the coverage
for required care, inefficiencies within the public insurance market need to be
identified.

IX. Conclusions
The study clearly suggests that individuals with healthcare insurance spend
more on healthcare than those without. However, this positive relationship is not
necessarily disadvantageous to the economy. Income was negatively correlated
with spending, suggesting that personal income is not spent on healthcare if
possible. In essence, providing public healthcare is subsidizing healthcare.
Insurance status, specifically public, has a strong positive effect on
healthcare expenditure. However income had a negative relationship with the
dependent variable. This suggests that the ability to pay does not affect
expenditure, but rather the source of the funds determines willingness and
demand. Services are purchased with insurance that the individual without
insurance would not require or value enough to attain.
If a healthier population is more productive, than the presence of moral
hazard suggested in this study may actually have a positive outcome in a general
equilibrium. The health of the population is a significant indicator of overall
wellness and should be invested in as long as the services rendered are
beneficial. Incentivizing the population to seek out healthcare when it is
necessary for health is advantageous to the American economy.
The level of benefit provided determines the value of healthcare services.
However, further studies should examine supplier side moral hazard. Over-
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diagnosis and over-prescription have been identified in developing countries and
should be examined in the U.S. market. Another potential issue is the
deadweight loss from leaving the free market system. In order to reconcile for the
subsidization provided by public healthcare, price ceilings should be
implemented to prevent excessive price increases within the market. The freeze
on Medicare physician fees from 1984 to 1986 is an excellent example of
increased regulation that should be considered in the future to help eliminate the
potential for supplier moral hazard.
Due to the limitations of the data, the results of this study do not
necessarily confirm the theory of moral hazard as it pertains to health risk
behaviors. Total expenditure is the product of market forces, social attitude, and
accidents. The study required a high-powered test to observe statistical
significance within the model. The study found that such large sample sizes do
not exist in longitudinal data sets for all of the relevant variables. Health risk
behaviors need to be examined over long periods of time in order to evaluate
how the lack of financial consequences in the healthcare market affects the
lifestyle choices of the individual.
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